

MAR 11 1946

PERIODICAL ROOM  
GENERAL LIBRARY  
UNIV. OF MICH.

# THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY

VOL. 39, NO. 8

December 3, 1945

WHOLE NO. 1034

**TITUS, AMOR AC DELICIAE GENERIS HUMANI (Price)**

**PLATO AND MODERN EDUCATION (Sullivan)**

## REVIEWS

HACKFORTH, Plato's Examination of Pleasure (*Morrow*)

BROWN, S. Aureli Augustini, De Beata Vita (*Gavigan*)

## Discovering Plato

BY ALEXANDER KOYRÉ

Translated by Leonora Cohen Rosenfield

A brief, lively and simple introduction to the reading of Plato, based on four of the great dialogues: the Meno, the Protagoras, the Theaetetus, and the Republic. It shows how the reader must himself formulate the answers to the philosophical problems raised in the dialogues.

"To tell so much about the ideas of an ancient philosopher and at the same time to whet the appetite for more is to show true artistry as well as good pedagogy."—*The Christian Century*

\$1.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

# THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY

Published weekly (on Monday) except in weeks in which there is an academic vacation or Armistice Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas, New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Easter, or Memorial Day. A volume contains approximately twenty-five issues.

Owner and Publisher: The Classical Association of the Atlantic States. Place of Publication: Bennett Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania. Printed by The Beaver Printing Company, Greenville, Pennsylvania.

Edward H. Heffner, Editor, Bennett Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

Franklin B. Krauss, Secretary and Treasurer, The Pennsylvania State College, Box 339, State College, Pennsylvania.

Associate Editor, Wm. C. McDermott; Contributing Editors: Charles T. Murphy, J. C. Plumpe, Bluma L. Trell.

Price, \$2.00 per volume in the Western Hemisphere; elsewhere \$2.50. All subscriptions run by the volume. Single numbers: to subscribers 15 cents, to others 25 cents prepaid (otherwise 25 cents and 35 cents). If affidavit to invoice is required, sixty cents must be added to the subscription price. For residents of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, or the District of Columbia, a subscription to THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY (or, alternatively, to The Classical Journal) is included in the membership fee of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, whose members are also entitled to The Classical Outlook and The Classical Journal at special prices in combinations available from the Secretary.

Entered as second-class matter November 7, 1945, at the Post Office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in the Act of February 28, 1925, authorized October 14, 1938.

Volume 39 contains issues dated: October 1, 8, 15, 22, 29; November 12, 26; December 3, 10, 17 (1945); January 7, 14, 21; February 4, 18; March 4, 11, 18; April 8, 15, 29; May 6, 13, 20; June 3 (1946).

## TITUS, AMOR AC DELICIAE GENERIS HUMANI

Suetonius begins his life of the emperor Titus with these words: Titus, cognomine paterno, amor ac deliciae generis humani—tantum illi ad promerendam omnium voluntatem vel ingenii vel artis vel fortunae superfuisset, et, quod difficillimum est, in imperio, quando privatus atque etiam sub patre principe ne odio quidem, nedum vituperatione publica caruisset.<sup>1</sup> No other emperor received such an eulogistic introduction at the hands of this biographer. It may be worth while to consider what facts and fancies recorded in the sources of our knowledge of Titus account for this amiable reputation, why Titus Flavius Vespasianus filius was the delight and darling of the human race and whether the facts show that he possessed such an abundance of natural ability, art, and fortune that he could naturally win the good will of all. Suetonius and those who follow him attest a change in Titus which made him more popular as emperor than before his accession. Dio discusses at length this change and the reasons for his good record. He concludes that, if he had ruled longer, it might have been shown that he owes his present good fame to *εὐτυχία* rather than to *ἀρετή*.<sup>2</sup>

The most striking thing about the accounts of Titus is the consistently favorable tone of all. Practically no criticism occurs except with regard to his faults before coming to power, and they are used merely to heighten his later excellencies by contrast. The appellation *amor ac deliciae* as applied to him, is echoed in Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, Ausonius, and other writers<sup>3</sup> after Suetonius, but it does not appear in Tacitus. We won-

der whether Suetonius originated it or adopted it. At least he gives no credit and does not even add *appellatus*. The words themselves are frequently used separately of 'the object of love' but the plural of *amor* is usual when in combination with *deliciae*. Cicero spoke of Roscius, the popular actor, *amores ac deliciae (suae)* and twice applied *amores ac deliciae populi Romani* to L. Antonius.<sup>4</sup>

The events of the brief life of our paragon may be summarized. Born in 39 A.D. in a modest house in Rome while his father was in the early stages of the military career which later brought him and his sons to the highest power, he died in his forty-second year after two years, two months, and twenty days of imperial rule (79-81 A.D.). His father's humble origin and rank at the time make improbable Suetonius's statement that Titus was educated at court with Britannicus and had an illness as a result of a taste of the poisoned drink which killed the young prince. With his usual love of the marvelous, Suetonius also tells that an astrologer, brought in by Narcissus to see Britannicus, divined the future emperor in Titus. His military tribuneship was served with distinction in Germany and in Britain, and he practised law in Rome (*operam foro dedit honestam magis quam assiduam*). He married twice and divorced his second wife, the high-born Marcia Furnilla, who was the mother of his daughter Julia. From 75 A.D. until his accession Berenice, daughter of Julius Agrippa, king of the Jews, lived with him in the palace. This lady had been favored by Vespasian during the Jewish War and with her brother had stayed in the Roman camp during the siege of Jerusalem.

After his quaestorship he served valiantly as commander of a legion under his father in Judaea, where Vespasian had been sent by Nero to put down the revolt of the Jews. When Galba's accession seemed assured, Titus, then twenty-nine years old, was sent by his father to offer congratulations to the new emperor, but

<sup>1</sup>Suet. Tit. 1.1; no references will be given for other statements drawn from this work or for quotations from it.

<sup>2</sup>Dio. 66.18.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. parallel passages cited in my edition of Suet. Tit. (C. Suetonii Tranquilli de Vita Caesarum Liber VIII Divus Titus, Menasha, Wisconsin. The George Banta Publishing Company, 1919).

<sup>4</sup>Cic. Div. 1.79; Phil. 13. 26 6. 12.

reached Corinth only to find that civil war had broken out again and that Galba was dead. He went back and on the way received promises of future power from the shrine of Paphian Venus, when he stopped there for advice about sailing, and perhaps, also, as Tacitus alleges<sup>5</sup>, because of a desire to see the sights of this famous shrine. When Vespasian was hailed emperor by his army and assured the support of Mucianus, the powerful governor of Syria, and the Syrian legions, he started for home via Alexandria and left Titus to finish the war. Josephus (*Bellum Iudaicum*) gives a full account of the siege and capture of Jerusalem, of which we have a monumental reminder in the friezes on the Arch of Titus in Rome. There are also accounts in the works of Dio and of Tacitus.<sup>6</sup>

By the accession of Vespasian to the principate, Titus became Caesar. The death of Nero and the end of the Julio-Claudian line had brought the opportunity for any successful general to advance to the principate. Tacitus says that amid the general joy at the death of Nero, various emotions were aroused in Rome among senators, people, and city soldiers, but also among all the legions and generals 'because the secret of empire was now disclosed, that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.'<sup>7</sup> This secret, learned by the accession of Galba at the behest of the Spanish legions, brought the terrible year 68-69 with Galba followed by Otho and Vitellius, the former put up by the pretorian guard, the latter by the legions in Germany, each called emperor for a short time, each overcome by the partisans of his successor. Vespasian, the candidate of the armies of the East, finally succeeded in establishing stable government and the Flavians ruled until the death of Domitian in 96. As Suetonius says at the beginning of his life of Vespasian: *Rebellione triumphum principum et caede incertum diu et quasi vagum imperium suscepit firmavitque gens Flavia, obscura illa quidem ac sine ullis maiorum imaginibus, sed tamen rei publicae nequaquam paenitenda, constet licet Domitianum cupiditatis ac saevitiae merito poenas luisse*.<sup>8</sup> Into this heritage Titus came in 70 after completing the conquest of Judaea. He shared a triumph with his father, was associated with him in the tribunician power, and was his colleague in the censorship and in seven consulships. He also became prefect of the pretorian guard, although heretofore this office was always held by knights.

Upon his father's death he became emperor. Important events in his brief reign were the completion

and dedication of the great Flavian amphitheatre (the Colosseum) and the small *Thermae Titi* near it. Great shows were given in the amphitheatre; gladiatorial contests, wild beast fights, and even a naval battle in the flooded arena. Martial's *de Spectaculis* tell of many curious and wonderful things shown on this occasion. Three terrible disasters befell the state during the rule of this fortunate emperor. The eruption of Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii, Herculaneum, and the country round about in Campania. A conflagration in Rome raged for three days and three nights. There was a serious epidemic (*pestilentia quanta non temere alias*). Under his auspices foreign war was waged in Britain by Agricola and he was hailed emperor for victories there.<sup>9</sup> Epigraphical evidence attests some building activity: the restoration of aqueducts, the repair of roads, buildings in the provinces dedicated to him, and the restoration of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, which had suffered in the civil wars and in the fires. He had some trouble with aspirants to power and one false Nero had to be put down by force of arms.<sup>10</sup>

At the close of the munera of 81, Titus fell ill and died in the same country villa as did his father. His last words caused wonder at the time and are still an interesting riddle. He said that he repented of only one deed, *neque enim extare ullum suum factum paenitendum excepto dumtaxat uno*. It was suggested that he meant his forbearance toward Domitian.<sup>11</sup> Others thought that he referred to relations with his brother's wife. We cannot know what he regretted, but his biographer does not accept any evil deed as possible. The grief at his death was great, and every variety of honor was paid him. Domitian showed jealousy of his brother's good fame after death, but was forced to permit his deification.<sup>12</sup>

As to the abundance of natural ability and acquired good qualities which Titus possessed, Tacitus bears witness in almost his first mention of him in his *Historiae* when speaking of the reasons why Titus was sent to Galba from Judaea: 'but the common people, who are always ready to invent, had spread the report that he had been summoned to Rome to be adopted... The report gained a readier hearing from the nature (*ingenium*) of Titus himself, which was equal to the highest fortune, from his personal beauty,<sup>13</sup> and a

<sup>9</sup>Tac. Agr. 20-22; Dio 66.20.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Excursus II of my edition of Suet. Tit.

<sup>11</sup>Dio 66.26.

<sup>12</sup>Suet. Dom. 2.3.

<sup>13</sup>When this paper was read at the St. Louis meeting, Professor Thomas S. Duncan remarked to me that, in the portraits of the Flavii on the coins, Domitian is somewhat more beautiful than Titus. I am of the opinion that none of the Flavii qualified for the terms 'beautiful' or 'handsome'; but if there is a balance of good looks on the side of Domitian, it might be because of the fear felt by the artist. Of course, *de gustibus non disputandum* applies to beauty.

<sup>5</sup>Tac. Hist. 2.2.

<sup>6</sup>Tac. Hist. 5.1-12; Dio 65.3-7.

<sup>7</sup>Tac. Hist. 1.4, translation of C. H. Moore. Other passages from Tacitus, quoted in translation not my own, are from the same translator.

<sup>8</sup>Suet. Vesp. 1.1.

certain majesty which he possessed.<sup>14</sup> Suetonius tells us that he was distinguished from childhood by physical and mental gifts which increased with years, that he was very handsome, dignified, and pleasing, of great physical strength, not very tall, *ventre paulo proiectiore!* His memory was excellent, and he was gifted in languages and extemporaneous composition of verse. He could sing and play accompaniments for his singing (*psallere*). He was skilled in shorthand and so speedy that he vied with his own secretaries in playful contests. His ability to imitate handwritings was so good that he once jestingly boasted that he would have made a good forger. This remark, quoted by Suetonius, and the fact that Domitian is said to have charged that he had been left joint-ruler (*participem imperii*) by his father's will and that Titus had changed it, induced the late John Carew Rolfe to suggest that the dying remark of Titus referred to this and that Titus had done this reprehensible act, not wishing to be hampered in his rule by his vicious younger brother.<sup>15</sup>

Tacitus tells us that Mucianus was influenced to support Vespasian for emperor chiefly because of his admiration for Titus. In his speech urging Vespasian to accept the imperial call we find these words: 'It would be absurd for me not to bow before the throne of a man whose son I should adopt if I myself held it.'<sup>16</sup> Again referring to Titus when he was left in charge of the Jewish War, Tacitus tells of the growing enthusiasm for Titus in the provinces and in the army. 'He was dignified and energetic in the field, arousing devotion by his affability and sharing with the common soldiers in the trials of the campaign: he often mingled with the soldiers both at work and on the march without impairing his position as general.'<sup>17</sup>

The remarkable change in Titus upon becoming emperor is probably overemphasized in the interest of rhetorical contrast by Suetonius and those who followed him. However, there is some support for a real change in him in the remarks of Tacitus about his return from the mission to Galba. 'Some believed that he turned back because of his passionate longing to see Berenice again, but his feelings toward her proved no obstacle to action. He spent his youth in the delights of self-indulgence, but showed more self-restraint in his own reign than in his father's.'<sup>18</sup> Perhaps this was an inherited characteristic, for Tacitus elsewhere says Vespasian was the only one of the emperors up to this time who changed for the better.<sup>19</sup>

Under his father Titus acted as pretorian prefect and conducted his duties in a manner characterized as *aliquanto incivilius et violentius*, actually suborning people to go around through the theatres and camps to demand the punishment of those who were under suspicion (*summissis qui per theatra et castra quasi consensu ad poenam poscerent*). He invited to dinner Aulus Caecina, a consular of whom he had written proof of treason, and had him killed there without trial. As emperor, however, he would be responsible for the death of no one, although there was occasion for severity. He accepted the office of pontifex maximus with a promise to keep *puras manus*, although this office had been no deterrent to violence in his predecessors. When two patricians were known to be aiming at power, he warned them to desist, promised them anything else that they wanted except the principate, and told them *principatum fato datum*, a statement of the divine right of kings not differing much from that in the Iliad *τῆν δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ*.<sup>20</sup> He even sent a message to allay the fears of the mother of one of the conspirators, and later offered them weapons to inspect when they were dining with him, showing thereby his genuine belief in his own right to rule. When he knew that his brother was disloyal, he merely begged him privately, with tears, to return his affection and publicly allowed him to share his power and be designated successor.

Under his father, he had shown rapacity, actually selling his influence in trials and extracting money from citizens in such ways, 'squeezing the sponges' as his father called it.<sup>21</sup> As emperor, he scrupulously abstained from the property of citizens and did not even accept the usual contributions. By a single edict he guaranteed all the benefactions of earlier emperors. He used all possible means to relieve the unfortunate victims of the disasters of his time, showing the *sollicitudinem principis et parentis*, and gave the ornaments of his own villas for the restoration of the city after the fire. He was generous in the provision of entertainment for the people. Even against the warnings of his friends and household, he gave favorable replies to all applicants for assistance. 'No one ought to go out unhappy from the presence of the emperor.' He was the original boy scout, and when he had done nothing for anyone one whole day, said, 'Amici, diem perdidit.'

Under his father he had been extravagant and had associated with evil companions. As emperor, he entertained modestly and chose the best friends and advisors. He dismissed Berenice, *invitus invitam*.

There seems, however, to be no reason to take the contrasts too seriously and to imagine a sudden con-

<sup>14</sup>Tac. Hist. 2.1.

<sup>15</sup>T.A.P.A. Vol. 45, pp. 42-46.

<sup>16</sup>Tac. Hist. 2.77.

<sup>17</sup>Tac. Hist. 5.1.

<sup>18</sup>Tac. Hist. 2.2.

<sup>19</sup>Tac. Hist. 1.50.

<sup>20</sup>Iliad 2.195.

<sup>21</sup>Suet. Vesp. 16.2.



version on the part of Titus. It is not strange that he found it possible to be more popular as emperor than as *tutor imperii* for his father. It is reasonable to suppose that he would become steadier as he grew older if he had a good ingenium, and less severe when the power was firmly established for his family, and less rapacious when the treasury had been replenished, and the family coffers well lined. When he came to Rome as Caesar at 30, his youth, the sudden contact with the charms of Roman society after military campaigning, and his new importance might easily lead him into a period of extravagance and riotous living. Responsibility would induce self restraint in a man naturally worthy. Dio quotes a remark of Titus on this very point: 'It is not the same thing to request a favor of another as to decide a case yourself, nor the same to ask something of another as it is to give it to someone yourself.'<sup>22</sup>

What of his good fortune? His reign had more than its share of disasters, but that was temporal and external misfortune. He was fortunate in ruling after the worst of the reconstruction following the civil wars had been accomplished. Dio's suggestion that the very brevity of his reign was good fortune is interesting. Nero was popular for a longer period than Titus' whole reign. Augustus reigned long and became popular with time, though disliked at first. Would the reverse have been true of Titus? No one can answer this, but perhaps a longer reign would have brought the absolute necessity for severity toward Domitian and others who did not like the restraint put on their nefarious practices by a good ruler. His generosity might have proved too great for the resources of the treasury and his private means. Retrenchment would have brought unpopularity. Disillusionment about the efficacy of the 'divinity that doth hedge a king' might have come if he found himself in danger of 'becoming a god'<sup>23</sup> before his time via the assassin's sword or a poisoned mushroom. He might have become a gloomy tyrant instead of the 'darling of the human race.' Certainly if all that his biographer and the historians say of Titus is true, it would be an ungrateful people who, after suffering from a Gaius and a Nero, did not hold him a darling and delight. We must then suppose that no sudden change occurred in Titus and that his faults when he was merely designated successor were due to youth and the necessity for severity in assisting to establish a new order after civil wars. The brevity of his reign may have been a real piece of *εὐτυχία*, but there seems to be evidence of sufficient *ἀρετή* to warrant for the time of his brief reign the title applied to him by Suetonius.

HELEN PRICE

MEREDITH COLLEGE

<sup>22</sup>Dio 66.19.

<sup>23</sup>Suet. Vesp. 23.4.

## PLATO AND MODERN EDUCATION

Although many splendid defenses of the Classics and of a liberal education have been published during the past few years, it still seems to me that the only real defense is a concrete presentation of some of the truths garnered directly from some of the ancient authors. I can, for example, write about the inspiring poetry of Homer or about the philosophy of Plato; but it will convince very few moderns that Homer and Plato are worth reading. If, on the contrary, I read a few selected passages from each of them and explain them, then I will begin to prove that both Homer and Plato have something worthwhile.

Take Plato, for example. One of the most disputed points in modern scholastic circles is post-war education. What should be taught? What should be the aim of that education? What changes should be made in the present systems? Unfortunately not many of those who are discussing this matter remember that Plato formulated a post-war system of education that is still worthy of deep study. His whole philosophy of education aimed at a system that would revivify an Athens that had just passed through a great war. Hence he was planning a post-war system of education, even as we are today.

He states clearly certain principles on which any real educational theory must be based and they are as essential today as they were then. His first supposition is that in a Democracy where all men are to be capable of ruling themselves each citizen must be highly educated. That, too, is presupposed in any modern theory in this country. What is more important, he grasped the lesson of the war and saw that from then on educators must turn their thoughts to higher realms. War proved to Plato that a purely naturalistic and materialistic education was absolutely base and useless. So the Wiseman of Athens shook the world with a new thesis, a new principle of education. 'The ideal of education is not the perfection of the body but the perfection of the spiritual part of man.' Man, he insists again and again, has a higher nature, an immortal soul. Therefore the first object of any education is to subject the lower nature, i.e., the body and its natural appetites to the higher or spiritual nature. Anything that would disrupt this harmonious subjection of body to soul has no place in any school. That is why later on he insisted on an index of forbidden books for young men. Some of the writers in this day, even as in our own day, display too vividly the supremacy of the body over the soul. Consequently they must be kept away from the youth.

Everything that he insists on with regard to the proper position of the material and the spiritual must be remembered by any modern educator who has the

welfare of youth in his heart. This war has taught us, too, that our educational aim must be higher, must be more spiritual, and that whatever debases the higher nature of man has no place in our schools.

Plato, still with his eye on right education, often touched upon another point that we dare not omit. He states clearly time and time again, 'VIRTUE IS KNOWLEDGE.' In other words, knowledge or education devoid of morality is not genuine knowledge. Plato could not conceive of a separation of morality from knowledge, of religion from education. Surely he plunged deep down into the very heart of all education by claiming as an absolute truth that religion and morality are essential parts of education. If we leave out these essentials from education we fail to know the very material on which we are working. For man is not a pure animal. Man has a soul and he has a lofty end in life. Plato, though a pagan, realized that man's end was not a purely natural one and that to attain his higher end he must preserve a proper harmony between soul and body. The only way man can preserve this harmony is by being taught true values. The youth must not confuse lead and gold, glass and diamond. Only the connection of morality and religion and the educational system will teach him this. As Mr. Jaeger says so well, 'Paideia for Plato is the soul's lifelong struggle to free itself from ignorance of the greatest goods which bars its way to its true welfare' (PAIDEIA, vol. 2, p. 152). And again, 'and the gaining of falsehood and error about things of the highest value is the source of all evil' (p. 153).

We see then that there is no confusion in Plato's mind concerning the real aim of education. Once he has determined his educational aim he has constructed a firm foundation for the rest of his system. Many moderns have not yet formed a clear notion of the aim of education. Until they do, their systems will be built on shifting sands. Plato realized, too, that all crimes and evils in the state were due to faulty education. When students have not been taught true values they choose the body and its pleasures in preference to the soul and its happiness. They think that wealth and fame are the essence of happiness. They mistake license for freedom, not knowing that true freedom is self-mastery and control over the passions and that it is not the being enslaved by the lower appetites. Do our teachers today realize all of these truths as Plato did? Perhaps they too are open to the charge which he made against many ancient teachers who taught what the crowd wanted and not what they should teach.

We have summed up briefly, therefore, some of the fundamental principles of Plato's educational theory. It is certainly amazing that a pagan should have formulated these tremendous truths. It is however more amazing that many moderns have not yet realized

that they must at least begin with these principles if they would present a worthwhile theory for post-war education. If they will only reread their Plato and accept what he has to offer and then add to these all the aids that Christianity can offer, surely their theories will then be valuable.

By showing how an ancient author can help us in one very pressing problem of today I hope I have in some way explained how Classicists can present a real proof that the Classics are of great importance to the modern world. They can still help us to make our lives happier and can still show us how to solve many modern problems.

PATRICK A. SULLIVAN, S. J.

WESTON COLLEGE

## REVIEWS

**Plato's Examination of Pleasure, a Translation of the Philebus, with Introduction and Commentary.** By R. HACKFORTH. vii, 144 pages. (Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1945). \$2.75.

Probably everyone who knows the late Professor Cornford's brilliant books on the later Platonic dialogues—Plato's Theory of Knowledge (1934), on the Theaetetus and Sophist; Plato's Cosmology (1937), on the Timaeus; and Plato and Parmenides (1939), on the Parmenides—has wished that he might have given us similar expositions of the Philebus and Statesman. The present volume goes far toward gratifying that wish, for it represents a piece of work undertaken by its author at the suggestion and with the encouragement of Cornford himself, and it conforms rather closely to the pattern set by the volume above mentioned. It is not a full-dress commentary in the traditional style; it does not supersede, but rather supplements, Bury's excellent edition, as Hackforth himself modestly warns us. The volume contains a brief introduction, followed by a translation of the dialogue, divided into sections each preceded by a brief commentary. Special difficulties in the text or content of particular passages are dealt with in footnotes. This method of treatment has already proved its usefulness, and there is every reason to believe that Hackforth's volume, like those of Cornford, will prove of great value both to the beginner and to the experienced reader of Plato.

The Philebus presents great difficulties to the translator and expositor. The text is frequently very obscure and apparently quite corrupt in spots. Hackforth generally follows Burnet's text, though in a score or more

passag  
adapte  
posed  
much  
to his  
the or  
violent  
58d w  
with e  
inadve  
'foreign  
beings  
clearly  
missed  
'thoug  
tarchu  
own,'  
of two  
has ac  
acter,

In l  
positio  
to the  
States  
ment  
philos  
Timae  
Epistl  
for th  
seem  
specul  
philos  
in the  
of the  
ing' t  
realize  
was n  
the 'i  
forth  
the th  
from  
in the  
that v  
has ar  
that c  
his at  
his lif  
the P  
Eudox  
we kn  
it is  
Hedo  
with l  
his an  
can as  
six dia

passages, where there is obvious corruption, he has adopted readings suggested by earlier editors or proposed emendations of his own. The translation is clear, much clearer, I should suppose, than Plato's text was to his contemporaries; and in general it follows closely the order of Plato's ideas. It is doubtful whether the violent rearrangement resorted to in the translation of 58d was necessary. Fowler's translation has preserved, with equal clarity, the order of the original. Was it by inadvertence or design that in the translation of 16a 'foreigners' (*βάρβαροι*) are grouped with 'human beings,' instead of with 'other animals,' as Plato's text clearly implies? An important point seems to have been missed in the translation of *ἐτέρῳ ὀνόματι* in 13a: 'though the things in question are unlike, you (Protarchus) designate them by a name other than their own,' whereas the proper rendering is, I think, 'by one of two alternative names.' That is, though Protarchus has admitted that pleasures may be opposite in character, he still describes all pleasures as good.

In his Introduction Hackforth argues that the composition of the *Philebus* can most naturally be ascribed to the years 360-354: it follows immediately on the *Statesman*, which he thinks expresses Plato's disillusionment resulting from the failure to make of Dionysius a philosopher-king, and immediately precedes the *Timaeus* trilogy, which like the seventh and eighth *Epistles* shows Plato's mind busily engaged on schemes for the political salvation of Sicily. These considerations seem unusually weak, even for what is admittedly only speculation. Plato's hopes of making Dionysius into a philosopher-king were never very high, as we can read in the seventh *Epistle* (328-330), and the experiences of the years 361-360 can hardly have been as 'shattering' to his political hopes as Hackforth assumes. Plato realized as early as the *Republic* that a philosopher-king was not likely to appear anywhere; and the ordering of the 'imitation-states' in the *Statesman*, which Hackforth seems to regard as a new motive, is a variant of the theme treated in *Republic* VIII and IX. Apart from the choice of *Hermocrates* as one of the persons in the *Timaeus* trilogy, there is nothing in the plan of that work, or in the political scheme it outlines, that has any particular reference to Sicily—nothing, in fact, that could not have been in Plato's mind and engaged his attention at any time during the last twenty years of his life. Another reason Hackforth gives for the placing the *Philebus* in the period 360-354 is the removal of Eudoxus and his school from Cnidus to Athens. But we know that Eudoxus came to Athens about 367, and it is at least just as probable that the discussion of Hedonism in the *Philebus*, if occasioned by the contact with Eudoxus, should have been composed shortly after his arrival, as ten or a dozen years later. At most we can assert that 368 or 367 is a terminus a quo for the six dialogues belonging to the latest group, and that the

Laws is the latest of the group. Nothing that Hackforth has said in his discussion of the matter, however interesting as speculation, affords the slightest solid ground for any more precise dating of the *Philebus*.

Fortunately Hackforth shows himself a more responsible and circumspect guide in the exposition of the contents of the dialogue. He refrains from finding more in the passage on dialectical method (15d-17a) than can legitimately be found there. He attaches no revolutionary significance to the 'new tactics' that Plato invokes (23b) to establish the function of Cosmic Reason in the universe. The 'four classes of being' (23-26) do not imply a rejection of the Ideas, nor a covert transformation of the doctrine into an identification of Ideas and Numbers, though 'in the *ἀπειρον* and *πέρας* of the *Philebus* we seem to see' this later doctrine of Idea-Numbers 'in the making' (41n). About the relation of Ideas to the four classes he concludes, very plausibly, that 'the Ideas are behind the *πέρας ἔχοντα* in the same way as they are behind the *εἶδη καὶ ἀριθμοί* of the *Timaeus*, . . . the model to which Cosmic Reason looks in its causation of the mixture' (41). Plato's treatment of what is ostensibly the main theme, the examination of the claims of pleasure to be the good, involves peculiar difficulties, because of the richness of the materials employed, the brevity of the arguments, the variety of Plato's motives, the abrupt transitions, and the apparent inconsistencies in concepts and methods. Most of these difficulties are lightened, and many of them vanish, under Hackforth's critical but sympathetic analysis. To those who find the conception of the good life in the *Philebus* difficult to adjust to the doctrine of the earlier ethical dialogues, he points out in how many respects the *Philebus* presupposes the doctrines of the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and other Socratic dialogues. 'It is only the false assumption that Plato must explicitly formulate the whole of his ethics whenever he writes on an ethical subject that might lead us astray' (9). This is a sound warning. If Hackforth had invariably kept it in mind himself he would not have argued that the absence of all political reference in this dialogue on the good requires us to suppose that it was written in a period of political disillusionment.

GLENN R. MORROW

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

**S. Aureli Augustini, De Beata Vita. A Translation, with An Introduction and Commentary.** By RUTH ALLISON BROWN. xvii, 193 pp. In Vol. LXXII of Patristic Studies (Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1944).

In 1926, Rev. J. P. Christopher published his fine study on St. Augustine's *De Catechizandis Rudibus* as volume VIII of the series in which the present work appears. Many studies of the same type and fashioned along the same lines have followed since then, outstanding among them being the work on St. Ambrose's *De Nabuthae* by Dr. Martin R. P. McGuire, the director of the dissertation under review. Now Dr. Brown's work takes its place along with Sullivan's excellent work on Book 4 of St. Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* as a worthy addition to the dissertations in the same series that deal with St. Augustine. While it is not a startling contribution, it does contain in very handy form much useful information on this early dialogue of Augustine at Cassiciacum.

An introduction of fifty-nine pages has, among other things, a sketch of the dialogue, Greek and Latin, pagan and Christian, as a literary form in antiquity. Here the author uses such works as Hirzel, Jordan, Puech, Christ-Schmid-Stählin, Bardenhewer, etc., to present a very acceptable view of this literary genre in its outstanding examples. This, perhaps, is the most useful part of the whole work, for it enables the reader of Augustine's dialogues to envisage them as part of a long and honorable development from at least the time of Plato.

Next comes a discussion of the *De Beata Vita* itself. Here is discussed the spiritual background, where the author shows that Augustine was already converted to Christianity before going from Milan to Cassiciacum. With regard to the exact date, however, the treatment is not quite satisfactory. The author presents a not fully digested account of opinions and takes no positive stand beyond the statement that the dialogue took place in the Fall of 386. A short sketch of the participants follows, and a plan of the work completes this part of the Introduction.

The influence of Seneca's *De Vita Beata* and of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* on Augustine's *De Beata Vita* is well indicated by juxtaposing the plans of the three works and by giving a good outline of each work individually. Likewise, a good table of parallel passages from Augustine and Seneca is given, but no such work is done for Cicero. The style is dealt with very briefly, since Bogan's work had already treated it sufficiently.

The text used is that of Knöll, and presumably his sigla also are employed, but the author has not indicated this. Very few misprints occur, for the proof

reading was done carefully. But p. 60, l. 11 has *quaene* for *quane*; and 94. 26 has *matutinus* for *matutinas*; and a few periods have crept in before the ends of sentences. The translation is usually very satisfactory, but in I.1 (*res*) . . . *a te iam inlustranda suscepta* is incorrectly translated: 'on which light will surely be thrown if you take it up,' which Tourscher rightly translates 'is taken up to be solved by you.' In I.4, *astra suspexi* is translated: 'I followed stars,' where Tourscher more properly has: 'I gazed at the stars.' In I.5, *nam cui parti terrae . . . me admoveam . . . prorsus ignoro*, we find: 'For I do not know at all how to approach . . . that part of the land,' but Tourscher has a closer rendering: 'For to what part of the land I shall go . . . absolutely I do not know.' In the same place, *hoc autem est ut me ames*, which Tourscher naturally takes as 'That is (I ask) that you love me,' Dr. Brown expands needlessly to: 'for this will be a proof that you love me.' In II.22, *quare peto, ne fastidio vobis sit, ad istam mensam cras etiam convenire*, we find 'Therefore, so that you may not be satiated, please assemble at this table again tomorrow.' Tourscher puts it more accurately: 'wherefore I ask that it be not a thing distasteful to you to come to this table again tomorrow.' Lastly, the context and grammar seem to indicate that *illud (que) vulgare* of III.26, *infidum hominem malo suo esse cordatum* should be rendered: 'the faithless man is wise to his own harm,' rather than: 'the faithless man is wise in his own evil,' as the translation has it. Tourscher is wrong here also.

The commentary is, in general, satisfactory. I would mention only two unfavorable points. First, there is practically no linguistic commentary for Augustine's Late Latin syntactical uses, though such commentaries have been a regular part of preceding works in the same series. Second, the notes occasionally give merely the reaction of the student instead of presenting necessary historical or philosophical background, or of citing further illustrative texts from other works of Augustine. I note only two important items missing from the bibliography: the articles by De Labriolle and Boyer on Augustine in the DHGE and the DSC respectively.

These criticisms, however, are not intended to indicate a general unscholarly quality in Dr. Brown's work. Quite the contrary, as the first part of this review implies. Just because her work has been so carefully done, this reviewer feels that the few points criticized stand out sharply by contrast with the book as a whole. He would like to see the author contribute further useful works in the same field. May later students of St. Augustine contribute works of the same quality in later numbers of the Catholic University of America series!

JOHN J. GAVIGAN, O.S.A.

VILLANOVA COLLEGE